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1. INTRODUCTION
The world wide decline in energy prices during the 1980s has led
to an increased focus on international trade in energy in general, and
on U.S. imports of low-priced foreign energy products in particular.
This increased focus has, in turn, prompted a national debate over the
impact of international energy trade on U.S. security, U.S. energy in-
dustries, and the U.S. economy as a whole.'
t The authors thank Jeffrey P. Bialos and Ethan S. Naftalin for their invaluable
assistance in the preparation of the speech upon which this article is based and of this
article.
* Partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New York; J.D. 1963, B.B.A. 1960, Univer-
sity of Michigan.
** Associate, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Washington, D.C.; J.D. 1985, University
of Pennsylvania; B.S.F.S. 1981, Georgetown University.
' See generally World Oil Outlook. Hearings Before the Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 100-39 (1987); U.S. DEP'T OF EN-
ERGY, ENERGY SECURITY: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987) [hereinafter ENERGY SECURITY]; Possible Effects of Changing World Crude
Petroleum Prices, USITC Pub. 1494, Inv. No. 332-161 (1984); W. HOGAN, THE $200
BILLION SURPRISE: ENERGY SECURITY AND THE OIL TARIFF (1987). Although petro-
leum imports have received perhaps the most attention because of the oil price shocks of
the 1970s, and the price collapse in the mid-1980s, see, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT U.S. OIL PRODUCTION: THE EFFECT OF Low OIL PRICES (1987), trade
in other energy commodities is beginning to gain increased attention as well. For exam-
ple, the impact of U.S. imports of refined and enriched uranium from Canada on the
domestic uranium industry has been the focus of sharp debate during consideration of
the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement. United States-Canada Free-Trade
Agreement done Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter FTA]. See,
e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on the
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 100-830 (1988); Hearings
Before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and
Power on Energy Provisions in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 100-179 (1988); Uranium Enrichment Program, Hearing Before the House
Subcommittee on Energy and Power, Commission on Energy and Commerce, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 100-57 (1987); Canada Reserves Increase; Facility Planned in NWT,
NUCLEAR NEWS Nov. 1987, at 55; One Hell of a Fight, MACLEAN'S, Oct. 26, 1987, at
26; Pact with Canada Splits U.S. Industry, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1987, at D8, col. 5;
On the Fast Track, Wash. Post, June 11, 1988, at A24 (FTA entangled with the
troubles of the U.S. uranium industry). See also Huffman v. Western Nuclear Inc.,
486 U.S. 663, 102 S. Ct. 2087 (1988) (holding that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §
161(v), 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v) (1982 & Supp. III 1983), does not require the Depart-
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One important aspect of this debate is whether U.S. unfair trade
laws, and in particular, the antidumping law2 and Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974' can be applied to energy trade. The antidumping
law forbids unfairly low pricing of imports, while Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 affords the President the authority to respond to
unjustifiable, unreasonable, and discriminatory acts, policies, and prac-
tices of foreign governments. Indeed, the antidumping law has already
been invoked in connection with trade in an energy product, fuel
ethanol.4
For domestic parties facing dumping or other unfair practices from
abroad, these laws provide the prospect that relief can be obtained, but
only if the domestic parties can satisfy the considerable statutory re-
quirements and prove the existence of an "unfair" practice warranting
remedial action. Prospective petitioners also face the at least equally
important question of whether available relief would prove effective if
obtained.
Conversely, foreign governments, producers, and importers face
the risk that their trade, businesses, and national policies will be dis-
rupted. They must determine whether they can prevail against claims
of unfair practices, and how best to minimize the resulting disruption if
they cannot.
Finally, proceedings under these laws with respect to energy trade
will likely raise unusual issues and questions of first impression that
will require creative arguments by counsel in order to fit energy prod-
ucts within legal frameworks typically applied to manufactured goods.
2. THE ANTIDUMPING LAW AND ENERGY IMPORTS
The antidumping law, which is set forth in title VII of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended, requires that antidumping duties be imposed
on imported merchandise if-
(1) the administering authority determines that a class or
kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to. be, sold
ment of Energy (DOE) to restrict enrichment of foreign uranium where such restric-
tion would not achieve the statutory goal of "assur[ing] the maintenance of a viable
domestic uranium industry" because the statute ties the degree of restriction to be im-
posed to the achievement of that goal). In addition, U.S. imports of electricity from
Canada have also gained increased attention. See H. LEE, N. FOSTER, & E. PARSON,
CANADIAN ELECTRICITY IMPORTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY,
ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS (1988).
2 Tariff Act of 1930, §§ 731-39, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-73i (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
3 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
' See Fuel Ethanol from Brazil, 51 Fed. Reg. 5,572 (1986). See infra notes 88-
102 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of this case.
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in the United States at less than its fair value; and
(2) the [U.S. International Trade] Commission determines
that . . an industry in the United States . . .is materially
injured, or . . . is threatened with material injury, or . . .
the establishment of an industry in the United States is ma-
terially retarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise
5
Once these statutory requirements have been met, Commerce must
impose an antidumping duty upon the imported merchandise in an
amount equal to the excess of the "foreign market value" (FMV) of the
merchandise over its "United States price" (USP).6
Within the framework of the antidumping laws, there are a num-
ber of specific issues that are likely to arise in cases involving energy
imports.
2.1. The Standing Requirement
An antidumping case brought pursuant to a private petition must
be filed by an "interested party . . . on behalf of an industry."' 7 Thus,
5 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
6 Several additional observations about this arcane and complicated procedure are
worth noting. First, an antidumping investigation is usually directed at all imports of
the subject merchandise from a named country or countries; that is, it is country spe-
cific, and covers imports from only the nations named in the petition.
Second, the antidumping statute does not require a finding of "predatory" dump-
ing (dumping below cost that is intended to destroy an industry). The Antidumping Act
of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982), a criminal statute that has rarely been invoked and
never successfully prosecuted to date, is the mechanism for challenging predatory pric-
ing. For a discussion of the legislative history and judicial construction of the 1916
Antidumping Act, see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F.
Supp. 251, 259 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
Third, the entire antidumping proceeding, which requires both "preliminary" and
"final" determinations by both the Department of Commerce (Commerce) and the In-
ternational Trade Commission (ITC) after public hearings, must normally, as a matter
of law, be completed within a one-year period. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673a-d (1982 &
Supp. 1987). The various deadlines are as follows: Commerce must decide whether to
initiate an investigation within 20 days following the filing of a petition; a preliminary
injury determination by the ITC is due within 45 days; a preliminary dumping deter-
mination is due by the 160th day (if the case is extraordinarily complicated, by the
210th day); a final dumping determination by Commerce is due on the 235th day (in
complicated cases on the 285th day); a final injury determination by the ITC is due by
the 280th day (in complicated cases by the 330th day); and the final publication of an
antidumping order is due 7 days following an affirmative final injury determination by
the ITC. These statutory deadlines make necessary the imposition of strict deadlines for
answering burdensome data requests on both domestic and foreign parties. The short
time frame is designed to allow relief to be granted in time to assist an injured domestic
industry before it has been irreparably weakened by less than fair value (LTFV)
imports.
' 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Although most antidumping
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a petitioner must meet two requirements in order to have standing.
First, the petitioner must be an "interested party," whose statutory
meaning includes the following possible parties: a manufacturer, pro-
ducer, or wholesaler in the United States of a product "like" the im-
ported product under investigation; a certified union, or other organiza-
tion or group of workers, representative of an industry engaged in the
production of a "like product;" a trade association, a majority of whose
members manufacture, produce, or wholesale a like product in the
United States; or an association, a majority of whose members is com-
posed of interested parties as described above with respect to a like
product.'
Second, the petitioner must be "representative" of the domestic in-
dustry, whether national or regional in nature. The domestic industry
is defined as the "domestic producers as a whole of a like product, or
those producers whose collective output of the like product constitutes a
major proportion of the total domestic production of that product."9
This requirement originally was construed to mean that the peti-
tioner must demonstrate the support of domestic producers accounting
for a majority of the domestic production of a product like the mer-
chandise under investigation in order to bring an antidumping proceed-
ing."0 The Department of Commerce (Commerce) has since ruled,
however, that a petitioner need not prove that at least fifty-one percent
of a domestic industry supports the petition. In practice, Commerce will
accept petitioners' claims that a majority of the industry supports a pe-
tition unless a substantial proportion of the domestic producers of the
investigated product come forward to oppose it."
In making its representativeness determination, Commerce may
exclude from consideration domestic producers that are also importers
cases are initiated on the basis of petitions filed by private parties, an antidumping
investigation can also be self-initiated by the Department of Commerce if it determines,
from available information, that a formal investigation is warranted. See 19 U.S.C. §
1673a(a). Commerce can draw upon information available from other governmental
bodies, such as the DOE, or the Department of the Interior. Indeed, the DOE, which
plays the lead role in energy policy matters, might recommend to Commerce that it
initiate a case.
8 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
) 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
'0 Gilmore Steel Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 670 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
See also S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 62, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 381, 448.
11 See Certain Textile Mill Products and Apparel from Malaysia, 50 Fed. Reg.
9,852, 9,853 (Dep't Comm. 1985) (final determination); Live Swine and Fresh, Chil-
led, and Frozen Pork Products from Canada, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,097, 25,098 (Dep't
Comm. 1985) (final determination); Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada,
51 Fed. Reg. 10,041, 10,043 (Dep't Comm. 1986) (final determination).
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because their interests are wedded to imports. 2 In Frozen Concen-
trated Orange Juice from Brazil, the exclusion of importing producers
resulted in a finding that the remaining domestic producers had stand-
ing to file the petition.13
Standing would likely be an issue in antidumping cases brought
with respect to various forms of energy imports. Although energy pro-
ducers, trade associations, and others in the industry plainly would
qualify as interested parties, in certain circumstances it may prove diffi-
cult for such parties to meet the "on behalf of" requirement. The natu-
ral gas industry, for example, is broad and diverse, consisting of inde-
pendent companies, wildcatters, and subsidiaries or affiliates of oil
companies. Consequently, it could be difficult for any particular group
of companies to prove that they account for a majority of domestic pro-
duction of natural gas. In such circumstances, the safer course may be
for a trade association or a union to bring the case.
Of course, since so many domestic energy firms are currently en-
gaged in importing cheap foreign energy products-especially oil, gas,
and electricity-they may be inclined to oppose any antidumping peti-
tion. If those firms accounted for more domestic production of the prod-
uct under investigation than could the petitioners, Commerce would
likely dismiss the petition for lack of standing. 4
Yet, as noted above, Commerce might well determine that energy
firms with substantial imports-the major oil companies, for exam-
ple-should be excluded in determining standing because their interests
are tied to imports. Such a ruling would facilitate meeting the standing
test. Thus, using the example of an oil case, if the major oil companies
(majors) opposing the case are excluded, the remaining independents
and wildcatters could be deemed representative of the domestic
industry.
2.2. Energy Forms: Merchandise or Services
The antidumping law authorizes an investigation only as to
12 See Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice from Brazil, 52 Fed. Reg. 8,324 (Dep't
Comm. 1987) (final determination) (excluding for standing purposes, juice producers
that import more than 50% of the juice they sell from Brazil); cf. Fabricated Automo-
tive Glass from Mexico, 50 Fed. Reg. 1,906 (Dep't Comm. 1985) (final affirmative
countervailing duty determination) (excluding two U.S. manufacturers of automotive
glass from the domestic industry because "they are the major importers . . . [with]
substantial ownership interest[s] in a Mexican exporter").
13 Orange Juice from Brazil, 52 Fed. Reg. at 8,325-26.
a' See Carbon Steel Plate from Japan, 51 Fed. Reg. 13,039, 13,040 (1986) (final
determination) (presumption in favor of standing can be overcome where a substantial
majority of the industry producing the "like" product opposed the petition).
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whether a class or kind of foreign "merchandise" is being imported at
less than fair value (LTFV).15 Thus, the statute confers antidumping
jurisdiction only with respect to commodities, and not with respect to
intangibles or services. The difficult issue is where the dividing line
between merchandise subject to the antidumping law and services not
subject thereto lies. 6
There is little doubt that oil, gas, coal, and uranium are merchan-
dise, and therefore subject to the antidumping laws. These articles of
commerce are sold to customers through distribution channels and are
classified as merchandise subject to customs duties under the Tariff
Schedules of the United States (TSUS).
The jurisdictional issue would likely arise, however, in cases in-
volving intangible energy forms such as electricity. Electricity is sold
through distribution channels like merchandise, and is consumed like
15 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (1982).
16 The customs law defines "merchandise" to include "goods, wares, and chattels
of every description." 19 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See Certain Auto-
mated Fare Collection Equipment and Parts Thereof from France, 47 Fed. Reg.
55,339 (Int'l Trade Comm'n 1987) (preliminary material injury determination) (The
French manufacturer of the subject merchandise also provided "testing, installation,
and interim maintenance services," which were excluded from the investigation. "In
customs usage . . . 'merchandise' describes a good having a physical existence rather
than intangibles."). See also J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT
40 (1969) (indicating that "service" dumping, the use of discriminatory pricing to en-
able an exporter, through minimal freight rates, to be able to offer his products at
lower prices, is not actionable dumping under the GATT).
However, the line between merchandise and services was blurred in previous in-
vestigations. See, e.g., Rail Passenger Cars from Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,042, 36,044-
45 (Int'l Trade Comm'n 1982) (preliminary material injury determination) (In addi-
tional views, Commissioner Calhoun stated: "We have never been called upon to con-
sider, for example, issues such as the applicability of the statute to services . . . . But
this investigation presents . . . exactly these novel and mixed questions of law and fact
... . Indeed, as an initial matter, we have before us the mixed question of what
exactly is being imported. Is it only components? . . . Or could the imported article be
the technological expertise of [the respondent foreign manufacturer]? These factual
questions, if they are to be considered, must be addressed along with the underlying
legal question of whether the imports referred to under Section 703 as 'merchandise'
include service functions"). Although Commissioner Calhoun's comments are not pre-
cisely on point here, inasmuch as they ' regard services that have been incorporated into
the merchandise under investigation, they nevertheless illustrate that the distinction be-
tween services and merchandise is not always clear.
11 See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, TARIFF SCHEDULES OF THE UNITED STATES
ANNOTATED, USITC Pub. No. 1910 (1987) [hereinafter TSUSA] No. 475.05-10, U.S.
INT'L TRADE COMM'N, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES,
USITC Pub. No. 2130 (1st ed. 1988) [hereinafter HTS] § 2709 (crude oil); TSUSA
No. 475.25-70, HTS § 2710 (refined oil and motor fuels); TSUSA No. 475.15-15,
HTS § 2711.11.00 (natural gas); TSUSA Nos. 475.18, 401.60, 517.51, 521.31, ITS §
2701.11.20 (coal); TSUSA No. 422.50, HTS § 2844.20.10 (uranium oxide); TSUSA
No. 422.52, HTS § 2844.10, .20.50 (uranium trioxide); TSUSA No. 629.50, HTS §
2844.10.10 (uranium metal); TSUSA No. 601.57, HTS § 2612.10.00 (uranium ore).
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merchandise. Yet, electricity was considered an "intangible" and, on
that basis, was specifically exempted from customs duties under the
TSUS. 18 In contrast to oil, gas, and coal, electricity has no TSUS
number.
On the other hand, some commentators have argued that electric-
ity could be treated as a tangible good, noting, for example, that the
Harmonized Tariff Schedules contain a classification for electrical en-
ergy." Nevertheless, whether this would transform electricity into mer-
chandise under the antidumping laws is an open question. Indeed, the
headnotes to the Harmonized System suggest otherwise: "Electrical en-
ergy shall not be subject to the entry requirements for imported mer-
chandise set forth in Section 484 of our Tariff Act of 1980 ...but
shall be entered on a periodic basis in accordance with regulations to be
prescribed by the Secretary of Treasury."2
A related problem might arise were a product like natural gas to
be sold in the United States at lower prices than in Canada, due to low
transportation charges for gas exports and higher transport rates for
domestic gas shipments. Determining whether such transport rates are
actionable under the antidumping law as price discrimination relating
to a product would be very difficult because gas pricing often is a com-
posite of the cost of the gas and pipeline transportation. The same issue
could arise with respect to electricity as well.
Finally, administering any antidumping order with respect to an
intangible energy form would be far from simple. Electricity from Ca-
nada is not entered through U.S. Customs, but over international
power lines. Thus, the government would have to devise a new system
to administer any antidumping duties to be imposed on such energy
forms.
2.3. Relationship of the Antidumping Law to Other Federal Regula-
tory Schemes
A number of federal agencies possess considerable authority over,
and expertise concerning, energy matters. The question thus arises as
to what, if any, involvement these agencies would or could have in an
antidumping proceeding.
First, the International Trade Commission (ITC) and Commerce
may seek to draw upon the expertise of these agencies-the ITC in
18 See TSUSA, General Headnote 5(c).
' See Powell, International Energy Trade and the Unfair Trade Laws, 11 U.
PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. - (1989); HTS § 2716.00.
20 See HTS ch. 27 note 5(b).
19891
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
defining an industry and in assessing injury and Commerce in deciding
whether to self-initiate a case. The Energy Information Administration,
for example, has a wealth of data concerning energy imports, domestic
production, consumption and the like that would be relevant to an ITC
injury determination.
Second, the interplay between the antidumping law and federal
statutes regulating the pricing of particular energy products, such as
natural gas2 and electricity,22 could give rise to issues of overlapping
agency jurisdiction and, where state public utilities are concerned,
23
federal preemption. In this regard, the existence of complex regulatory
regimes might preclude the application of the antidumping laws to nat-
ural gas and electricity imports.2 4 Sharing jurisdiction over an energy
import with another federal agency, such as the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission, or with a state utility commission, is also problem-
atic. For example, in determining the United States price of imported
electricity or natural gas, Commerce would be confronted with the par-
adox of determining the "fair market value" of these products in the
context of a regulated industry. Furthermore, the imposition of an an-
tidumping duty by Commerce on electricity or natural gas might di-
minish another regulatory agency's ability to control the prices of those
commodities.
21 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 717, 717c-717e (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(C) (1982)
(authorizing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERO) to establish, review,
and enforce rates and charges for the transportation and sale of natural gas by a pro-
ducer or gatherer or by a natural gas pipeline or natural gas company).
2 See 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1982 & Supp. 1987); 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(B) (1982)
(authorizing FERC to establish, review, and enforce rates and charges for the transmis-
sion or sale of electric energy).
23 See ENERGY SECURITY, supra note 1, at 134 ("Rates for retail electricity sales
are typically set by State or municipal authorities."). See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. SERV. L. §
66(12) (McKinney 1990).
24 One may draw an analogy with conflicts between judicial enforcement of the
antitrust laws and advancement of regulatory goals. Some courts have determined that
an agency's jurisdiction was exclusive, preempting judicial application of the antitrust
laws. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975)
(holding that, notwithstanding alleged restraints on the sale of mutual fund shares,
repeal of the antitrust laws was necessarily implied "to assure that the federal agency
entrusted with regulation ... could carry out that responsibility free from the disrup-
tion of conflicting judgments by courts exercising jurisdiction under the antitrust
laws"). Similarly, Commerce might determine that another agency, such as FERC, has
exclusive jurisdiction over particular energy products. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION,
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, 599-605 (2d ed. 1984).
Indeed, the trade laws themselves contain provisions directing one agency to yield
jurisdiction over a case to another agency in particular circumstances. See, e.g., 19
U.S.C. § 1337(b)(3) (1982) (whenever the ITC has reason to believe that claims in a
section 337 investigation come within the purview of the antidumping or countervailing
duty laws, it shall notify the Secretary of Commerce to that effect and may suspend its
investigation pending the Secretary's decision on the matter).
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Such issues could be resolved on a case-by-case basis using a three
step analysis. First, one should look for an express repeal of the an-
tidumping law for the energy product in question."5 If there has been
no express repeal, one should determine whether the statutes can be
construed in a consistent fashion.26 Finally, where the regulatory re-
gimes are in clear conflict and not reconcilable, the most recent statute
governs under the "last in time" rule."
Finally, there are questions of policy and agency discretion.
Whereas the views of other federal agencies would be sought to help
shape relief at the Presidential level in a Section 201 "escape clause"
case or a Section 232 "national security" case, these agencies would
play little role in an antidumping investigation. Once the requisite find-
ings are made by the ITC and Commerce, Commerce must impose an-
tidumping duties in the amount of the dumping; it has no discretion in
this regard.
These energy agencies can play a policy role only in counselling
Commerce whether to self-initiate a case or in persuading Commerce to
settle a case before making a final determination of LTFV imports.
Under the antidumping law; Commerce has flexibility to suspend a
proceeding and to enter into agreements with respondents (including,
possibly, the foreign governments) that provide certain assurances that
the respondents will raise their prices so as to eliminate dumping mar-
gins.28 In certain circumstances, the agencies may prefer such negoti-
ated agreements, which provide the flexibility to shape remedies that
best fit the attendant circumstances.
25 See N. SINGER, IA SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 23.07 (4th
ed. 1985) [hereinafter SINGER].
28 See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 689-95 (1948) (concurrent Federal
Trade Commission and Department of Justice jurisdiction approved); Friedlander v.
United States Postal Serv., 658 F. Supp. 95, 103 (D.D.C. 1987) (approving concurrent
Postal Service, Food and Drug Administration and Federal Trade Commission juris-
diction. "[Wihere more than one regulatory system is applicable to a certain subject
matter, both systems are to be given effect and reconciled.").
27 See SINGER, supra note 25, § 23.09 ("Where there is an ambiguity in the stat-
ute, the legislative intent is the source of compromise, but where a conflict is readily
seen by an application of the later enactment in accord with that intent, it is clear that
the later enactment is intended to supersede the existing law."); cf. Galliano v. United
States Postal Serv., 836 F.2d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Federal Election Campaign Act, 2
U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), impliedly repealed the prior enactment of
the Postal Service's jurisdiction over mailings by political action committees to solicit
money; FECA's detailed, specific provisions controlled matters that might otherwise fall
under the total governance of the more broadly conceived and crafted postal fraud pre-
scriptions contained in 39 U.S.C. § 3005 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). Similarly, a detailed
and specific regulatory scheme for pricing a particular energy product arguably should
be given priority over a broader statute designed to counteract price discrimination of
imported merchandise in general.
28 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(b) (1982).
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2.4. The "Fair Value" Determination
Commerce's calculation of LTFV and dumping margins-the dif-
ference between foreign market value (FMV) and United States price
(USP)-is a highly technical and complex exercise.
2.4. 1. Foreign Market Value
FMV is primarily defined as the price at which such or similar
merchandise is sold or, in the absence of sales, offered for sale in the
principal markets of the country from which it is exported, in the usual
wholesale quantities, and in the ordinary course of trade for home
consumption.29
If home market sales do not exist, or if sales made at prices above
the cost of production are insignificant in relation to exports (the cutoff
point is normally five percent), then sales of such or similar merchan-
dise for export to third countries other than the United States will form
the basis for FMV.3 If home market sales constitute less than five per-
cent of all non-U.S. exports, third country sales or "constructed values"
will be used.3'
If home market and third country sales are nonexistent or unrelia-
ble, FMV will be based on the product's constructed value.12 Com-
merce must also resort to constructed value where home market or third
country sales, whichever are relevant, are made at or below the cost of
production over an extended period of time, in substantial quantities,
and at prices that do not permit recovery of all costs within a reasona-
ble period of time in the normal course of trade."3 Under the antidump-
ing law, constructed value is the sum of the costs of materials and
fabrication, general expenses, and profit. 4
To produce a fair, or "apples to apples," comparison with USP,
calculating FMV requires a number of complicated adjustments to ac-
count for differences in levels of trade," quantities sold, 6 "other cir-
29 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B) (1982).
30 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B) (1982).
31 19 C.F.R. § 353.4(a) (1988).
32 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(2) (1982).
33 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1982). See, e.g., 64K Dynamic Random Access Memory
Components from Japan, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,943 (1986).
3" 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1982). General expenses must equal at least ten percent
of the material and fabrication costs and profit must equal at least eight percent of all
costs. Id.
35 19 C.F.R. § 353.19 (1988).
36 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(A) (1982).
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cumstances of sale," 37 and the merchandise being compared., In addi-
tion, when the "exporter's sale price" (ESP) is used as the basis for
determining USP, 9 FMV may be further adjusted by deducting indi-
rect selling expenses up to the amount of general selling expenses de-
ducted from ESP.4"
2.4.2. United States Price
Under the statute, USP is defined as either "purchase price" (PP)
(essentially, the price at which the imported merchandise is sold to an
unrelated purchaser in the United States),"' or ESP (the price at which
the imported merchandise is resold in the United States by or for the
account of the exporter).42
Both PP and ESP are adjusted to ensure that: (a) they include,
among other things, the cost of containers, coverings, and packing, and
indirect taxes imposed on the subject merchandise that are rebated or
not collected by reason of its exportation;43 and (b) they do not include
the costs associated with bringing the subject merchandise from the
place of shipment in the exporting country to the place of delivery in
the United States.'4 In addition, ESP must be further reduced by the
amount of: (a) commissions, but not profit, for selling the merchandise
in the United States; (b) expenses generally incurred in selling the sub-
ject merchandise in the United States; and (c) any increased value re-
sulting from a process of manufacture or assembly performed on the
subject merchandise after importation and before its first sale to an un-
related purchaser.45
2.4.3. Calculating FMV and USP for Energy Products
The complexity of the price calculations, and the associated adjust-
ments, make it difficult for domestic energy producers contemplating a
dumping petition to determine whether LTFV dumping has, in fact,
occurred.
Energy prices may include transportation expenses that vary sig-
nificantly between domestic and export markets.46 The requisite adjust-
.7 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(B) (1982).
38 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(C) (1982).
See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
40 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(a), (c) (1988).
41 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b) (1982).
42 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c) (1982).
4' 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1) (1982).
44 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(2) (1982).
4. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e) (1982).
48 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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ments for transportation costs may significantly affect the dumping
analysis. Suppose, for example, that an energy product is sold in Ca-
nada at thirty dollars per cubic meter, with home market transportation
costs of eight dollars per cubic meter. At the same time, the energy may
be exported to the United States at twenty-five dollars per cubic meter,
with only two dollars per cubic meter in transport costs. At first blush,
the pricing appears discriminatory-thirty dollars in the domestic mar-
ket versus twenty-five in the United States, or a dumping margin of
five dollars. Yet, under the dumping analysis, adjustment must be made
for the transportation costs by deducting eight dollars from the thirty
dollar home market price and two dollars from the twenty-five-dollar
export price. The result is twenty-two dollars in the home market and
twenty-three dollars in the United States, or no dumping margin at all.
Similarly, price differentials may be explained by differences in
the circumstances of sales, such as commissions, payments to agents,
and other selling expenses, between the United States and home mar-
kets. Such differences, too, are factored into the dumping equation and
will often affect final dumping margins.
Petitioners in antidumping cases involving energy products may
also seek to avoid the use of home market prices as the benchmark for
FMV because many energy producing nations sell energy at very low
prices at home to encourage economic growth, while selling at higher
prices abroad. Such two-tier pricing is common.47 In such circum-
stances, petitioners may successfully avoid the use of home market
prices as FMV on the ground that foreign producers sell only a small
percentage of their energy output in their home markets. Particularly
in oil and gas markets, which are international in scope, foreign pro-
ducers may sell the majority of their product in export markets. Thus,
using third country pricing or constructed value may prove to be a key
issue in some cases.
A decision by Commerce to use constructed value in lieu of domes-
tic or export prices may not be beneficial to petitioners. In the oil and
gas industries, for example, the cost of production in oil-producing na-
tions (especially in the Middle East) is very low. Of course, the cost of
production of other energy sources, which are driven by oil prices, may
be different. The costs of these alternative energy sources are higher
than oil, and market prices of these sources have been depressed be-
cause of the abundance of low-priced oil and gas. Calculating con-
"" Indeed, petitioners have alleged that such two tier pricing confers a subsidy.
See, e.g., Portland Hydraulic Cement and Cement Clinker from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg.
43,063, 43,066 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final determination); Carbon Black from Mexico,
48 Fed. Reg. 29,564, 29,566 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final determination).
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structed value involves calculating not only the costs of exploring for,
drilling, and extracting oil, but also an imputed cost or value of the oil
in the ground (in essence, the "material" cost).48
In short, foreign producers and importers can use the FMV and
USP formulae in setting prices so as to avoid LTFV sales. When im-
ports from a nation are increasing, and the U.S. industry is losing sales
to imports, such precautionary actions are advisable. Notwithstanding
good faith efforts to avoid dumping, however, a foreign producer cannot
entirely eliminate the risk of antidumping proceedings. Since cases are
brought against all producers from a country, and are not company-
specific, the conduct of one or two large producers from a country can
lead to a finding of LTFV imports and the imposition of an antidump-
ing order against all producers from that nation. A company that has
priced high enough may avoid actual duties under the order, but com-
petitive circumstances can make such pricing difficult.
2.5. The Injury Phase
In the injury phase of the proceeding, the ITC must determine:
(1) the scope of the domestic industry that produces a product like the
article under investigation; (2) whether the industry is materially in-
jured or is threatened with material injury; and (3) if so, whether the
injury or threat thereof is by reason of LTFV imports.
"" An example of "imputing" the cost or value of a natural resource can be found
in Commerce's preliminary affirmative countervailing duty determination in Certain
Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453, 37,457 (Dep't Comm.
1986). Commerce was investigating, inter alia, provincial stumpage programs whereby
the provincial governments sold or leased rights to cut and remove standing timber from
provincial forest lands. Id. at 37,454. The petitioners successfully contended that these
programs conferred a good, timber, to Canadian lumber companies at preferential
rates. Id. at 37,454-55. In order to determine the amount of the benefit conferred,
Commerce recognized that it had to determine the value of the timber itself, as well as
other costs. Id. at 37,457. "The primary input into the selling of stumpage rights is the
tree itself. While the provincial governments incur no direct costs for trees and the land
on which they are situated, an imputed or indirect cost is associated with the intrinsic
value of the tree and land." Id.
Commerce, however, had no information available "that reflect[ed] the exact value
of provincial timber resources . . . ." Id. It resolved this problem by selecting "surro-
gates that best portray[ed] timber value in each province. For British Columbia and
Alberta, we used competitive bid prices [for stumpage] under government administered
programs as surrogates for the value of standing timber in these provinces . . . . For
Quebec and Ontario we used private prices [for stumpage] reported in the New Bruns-
wick response as a surrogate." Id. at 37,457-58.
Reliance on such surrogate measures, however, would likely be more problematic
where energy products are involved. For example, virtually all foreign oil is owned and
extracted by foreign governments. Consequently, there might not be alternative bidders
or private owners whose valuation of the oil could be used for comparison.
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2.5.1. The Like Product Determination
Under the antidumping law, the ITC must find a domestic indus-
try producing a like product. The statute defines a like product as a
product that is like, or, in the absence of like, most similar in character-
istics and uses with, the imported article subject to investigation.49 In
making its like product determination, the ITC traditionally examines
the following criteria: (1) physical characteristics and uses; (2) inter-
changeability of products; (3) channels of distribution; (4) customer
perceptions of the articles; and (5) common manufacturing equipment,
techniques, facilities, and production employees.5"
The like product determination is not, in and of itself, a mecha-
nism for ending the proceeding because the ITC must find the domestic
industry producing the product the "most similar" in characteristics
and uses to the imported article. Yet, the like product determination
can figure prominently in the outcome of the case; what industry is
selected may affect whether material injury is found. Moreover, the
ITC may elect to separate the subject imports and competing domestic
products into different like products. In such circumstances, the ITC
must make separate injury findings with respect to each of the indus-
tries producing the like products. 5 Thus, the ITC could make an af-
firmative injury determination for one group of like products, and a
negative injury finding for another group. Obviously, this would create
an incentive for foreign producers to shift production towards products
outside the scope of the antidumping order, which, in turn, could have
a significant impact on energy trade.
Although energy products are typically viewed as fungible (i.e., oil
is oil and gas is gas), the determination of what particular energy prod-
ucts are like other energy products can be critical in determining the
outcome of energy products cases. One potentially dispositive issue is
whether unprocessed energy forms (e.g., crude oil) are like processed
energy forms (e.g., refined oil products). Such considerations will be
important not only in determining what industry segment will. be ana-
lyzed for injury purposes, but also whether the relief will be meaning-
ful. Different determinations on crude oil and refined oil products, for
example, could result in a dumping order against crude oil, but not on
refined products. This outcome would create incentives for foreign pro-
4. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1982).
1o See, e.g., Digital Readout Systems and Subassemblies thereof from Japan,
USITC Pub. 2150, Inv. No. 731-TA-390 (Jan. 1989) (final injury determination).
51 See, e.g., Certain Radio Paging and Alerting Receiving Devices from Japan,
USITC Pub. 1410, Inv. No. 731-TA-102 (Aug. 1983) (final injury determination)
(separating tone-only pagers from display pagers for injury determination).
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ducers and exporters to refine their products before sale to the United
States, which, in turn, would have a significant impact on the domestic
refining industry. It would also continue to materially injure the do-
mestic crude oil industry.
Energy products may be differentiated under the "like product"
criteria employed by the Commission. For example, the ITC could con-
sider the end use of the energy product in making its determination.52
For example, a petroleum product used primarily as a motor fuel can
be distinguished from a second petroleum product used as residual fuel
oil even though both are produced from crude oil.
A second factor the ITC could consider is the energy product's
physical characteristics. Petroleum products, for example, have been
distinguished for customs purposes on the basis of gravity, sulphur con-
tent, flashpoint, pouring point, and kinematic viscosity.53 Natural gases
are differentiated in the tariff schedules by type (e.g., ethane, methane,
butane) and by minimum purity levels. 4 Coal is differentiated in the
tariff schedules by form and by uses.55 All of these characteristics could
be used to distinguish energy imports from domestic products.
2.5.2. Excluding Certain Producers from the Domestic Industry
In determining the domestic industry producing a like product, the
ITC is statutorily permitted to exclude producers "related to exporters
or importers" from the domestic industry "in appropriate circum-
stances."56 In assessing whether domestic firms should be excluded as
"related parties," the ITC considers the following factors: (1) the per-
centage of domestic production attributable to the related importer or
producer; (2) the reasons that the domestic firm has chosen to import
the subject merchandise (i.e., whether the firm benefits from the LTFV
articles or whether the firm must import in order to continue domestic
production and compete in the domestic market); and (3) the position of
the related producers vis-A-vis the rest of the domestic industry.
The exclusion of such related producers could have a significant
impact on the outcome of energy cases. As noted above, many of the
"majors" import significant amounts of oil. If such firms were ex-
62 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
5 See Coastal States Marketing Inc. v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 255 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1986), affd, 818 F.2d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
5' TSUSA No. 475.15. See also HTS § 2711.
" TSUSA No. 521.31. Cf HTS §§ 2701-04.
56 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(B) (1982).
" See Rock Salt from Canada, USITC Pub. 1798, Inv. No. 731-TA-239 (Jan.
1986) (final injury determination).
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cluded, the industry determination would focus on the injury to in-
dependents and wildcatters-which are more adversely affected by low
priced oil imports. Given the international nature of many energy mar-
kets, this issue is likely to arise in cases involving other energy forms as
well.
2.5.3. The Injury Standard
Under the antidumping law, the ITC must decide whether the
domestic industry producing the like product is materially injured or
threatened with material injury. The statute defines material injury as
"harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant."58 In
making its material injury determination, the ITC must consider,
among other factors, a number of criteria set forth in the statute: (1)
the volume of imports of the merchandise subject to the investigation;
(2) the effect of imports of such merchandise on prices of like products
in the United States; and (3) the impact of imports on domestic produc-
ers of like products. 9
The statute requires the ITC to consider certain factors with re-
spect to each of the criteria set forth above. In evaluating the volume of
imports, the statute requires the ITC to consider whether the volume of
imports, or any increase in that volume (either in absolute terms or
relative to domestic production or consumption) is significant.60 In eval-
uating the effect of imports of the subject merchandise on prices in the
United States for like products, the statute requires the ITC to deter-
mine whether there has been significant price undercutting by the im-
ported merchandise of the like products in the United States; in addi-
tion, the ITC must determine whether, to a significant degree, such
imports otherwise depress domestic prices, or prevent domestic price
increases that would otherwise have occurred.61 In evaluating the im-
pact of imports of such merchandise on domestic producers of like
products, the statute requires the ITC to evaluate all relevant economic
factors that have a bearing on the condition of the domestic industry,
including the following factors: (1) any actual or potential decline in
output, sales, market shares, profits, productivity, return on invest-
ments, or utilization of capacity; (2) factors affecting domestic prices;
and (3) any actual or potential negative effect on cash flow, inventory,
employment, growth, ability to raise capital, or investment.62
58 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (1982).
59 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B) (1982).
6o 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(i), (C)(i) (1982).
61 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(ii), (C)(ii) (1982).
62 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(iii), (C)(iii) (1982).
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In assessing injury under these criteria, the statute requires the
ITC to focus solely on those operations of the domestic producers en-
gaged in the manufacture of the like product, rather than on the pro-
ducer's entire operations.6" If separate data on domestic production or
producer profits are not available, however, then the injurious effect of
the dumped imports is evaluated with respect to the narrowest group or
range of products, which includes a like product, for which the neces-
sary data are available. 4
Given the size and breadth of an energy industry, the assessment
of injury in energy cases may be a substantial undertaking. Procedur-
ally, the investigation by the ITC, including the issuance of question-
naires, would be very time-consuming. As to the merits, the size and
diversity of these industries could also make proving injury difficult -
the profitability of energy firms may vary significantly with size and
relative efficiency.
The injury test, however, should not create any significant hurdles
in a case involving imported oil, particularly in view of the oil indus-
try's collapse in 1985 and 1986. Cheap oil imports plainly have had a
significant impact on the U.S. oil industry, however it is defined. Many
domestic energy firms have suffered significant losses in their oil pro-
duction divisions in recent years. Of course, these companies may have
reported overall profits due to strong performance in other fields, such
as chemical production. However, the overall profitability of these firms
would not preclude an affirmative material injury finding in an oil or
gas case since the ITC would examine only those operations of energy
firms engaged in domestic production of like energy products, or if sep-
arate data is not available, the narrowest product grouping for which
the firm keeps separate data.
2.5.4. Cumulation
The antidumping law permits the ITC to assess cumulatively the
volume and effect of imports of like products from two or more coun-
tries if such imports compete with each other and with domestically-
produced products in the U.S. market.65 Since many energy forms are
sold in international markets, pricing and other sales practices can be
very similar from one nation to another. Thus, there is a fair prospect
that an energy antidumping case, if brought, would be against imports
from more than one nation, and that such imports would be cumulated
63 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(D) (1982).
64 Id.
6-5 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv) (Supp. V 1987).
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for determining injury.
The ITC can also make an affirmative determination upon a
showing of a threat of material injury.66 The finding must have a "ba-
sis of evidence" that the threat is "real," and that "actual injury is
imminent;" it "cannot be made on the basis of mere conjecture or
supposition.""
2.5.5. Threat of Injury
In determining whether an industry in the United States is
threatened with material injury by reason of LTFV imports, the ITC
must consider, inter alia, the following factors: (1) any increase in pro-
duction capacity, or existing unused capacity, in the exporting country
likely to result in a significant increase in imports of the merchandise to
the United States; (2) any rapid increase in U.S. market penetration,
and the likelihood that penetration will increase to an injurious level;
(3) the probability that imports of the merchandise will enter the
United States at prices that will have a depressing or suppressing effect
on domestic prices of the merchandise; (4) any substantial increase in
inventories of the merchandise in the United States; (5) the presence of
underutilized capacity for producing the merchandise in the exporting
country; (6) any other demonstrable adverse trends that indicate the
probability that the importation (or sale for importation) of the mer-
chandise, whether or not it is actually being imported at the time, will
be the cause of actual injury; and (7) the potential for product shifting
if production facilities owned or controlled by the foreign manufactur-
ers that can be used to produce articles subject to a pending dumping or
countervailing duty investigation or final order are also used to produce
the merchandise under investigation.68
2.5.6. The "By Reason of' Requirement
In order to make an affirmative finding, the ITC must also find
that the domestic industry has been injured or threatened with injury
"by reason of" the LTFV imports. Under this test, LTFV imports
need not be a cause of injury greater than any other cause (as would be
the case in a Section 201 or "escape clause" investigation), but need
only be a significant factor in causing injury. 9 The factors considered
66 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2)(A)(ii) (1982).
67 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(ii) (Supp. V 1987).
68 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F) (Supp. V 1987).
6' See, e.g., Certain Forged Steel Crankshafts from Brazil, USITC Pub. 2038,
Inv. No. 701-TA-282 (Nov. 1987) (final injury determination); S. REP. No. 249,
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in determining causation include the following: (1) the volume of im-
portation; (2) the level of market penetration by the imports; (3)
whether there has been substantial price undercutting by the foreign
producers that tends to depress or suppress domestic prices; and (4)
whether domestic sales have been lost to the foreign merchandise."0
Typically, the ITC will evaluate the fungibility of the imported
articles and the domestic like products in determining causation. As a
general matter, the more fungible the two products are, the more likely
it is that price will be the determining factor in the sale and, hence,
that the ITC will find a sufficient causal connection between the
LTFV imports and the injury to the domestic industry (in the form of
lost sales).
If an antidumping case were brought against energy imports and
the ITC found the U.S. industry to be suffering material injury, the
relatively low causation requirement would not, in all probability, be a
serious obstacle to relief. 1 Unlike many consumer products where dif-
ferences in quality or style may have a large impact upon final sales,
energy products are highly fungible-whether in raw or refined form.
Given such fungibility, price is likely the determining factor in final
sales of most energy products, and LTFV imports would likely be
found to displace domestic product sales on a price basis. In such cir-
cumstances, the ITC could not easily conclude that LTFV imports
were not a factor in causing harm to the industry.
supra note 10, at 75, 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 461.
0 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B), (C) (1982).
71 Additionally, as a procedural matter, the ITC is likely to find a reasonable
indication of material injury at the preliminary determination stage of an energy case.
This is so because the burden of proof that must be met by respondents to reach a
negative preliminary injury determination is exceedingly high. See American Lamb Co.
v. United States, 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (ITC may issue negative preliminary
determination only when the record as a whole contains clear and convincing evidence
that there was no material injury or threat of such injury, and that no likelihood exists
that contrary evidence will arise in final investigation).
The practical consequences are that antidumping cases will have price effects on
energy imports at the preliminary determination stage. The reason is that affirmative
preliminary determinations by Commerce and the ITC result in a suspension of liqui-
dation of entries by Customs pending the final determination and the imposition of an
antidumping duty order, if appropriate. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d) (1982). Imported energy
products cannot be withdrawn from the Customs warehouse unless the importer posts a
cash bond to guarantee the payment of the antidumping duty. Because the final margin
may be substantially different from the preliminary margin, there may be considerable
uncertainty as to the amount of the cash bond. The payment of a cash bond, in turn,
may compel the importer to raise the price for the energy products, even though the
final determination may turn out to be negative.
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2.6. The Non-Market Economy Antidumping Provision
The statute contains special antidumping provisions addressing the
problems presented by imports from state controlled or non-market
economies (NMEs)."2 In NMEs, home market prices and costs are set
by the state and do not reflect what market economists would consider
to be reliable indicia of a product's fair market value or costs. For these
reasons, the antidumping law requires that FMV be determined in
NME cases on the basis of prices charged for such or similar merchan-
dise by a producer in a "surrogate" country selected by Commerce.7 3
Commerce Department regulations require, where possible, the
selection of a surrogate country which is at a comparable stage of eco-
nomic development to the exporting NME under investigation.74 In
comparing levels of economic development of the NME and a prospec-
tive surrogate, Commerce considers such factors as per capita gross na-
tional product and infrastructure development." If no surrogate pro-
ducer can be located, or if no producers are willing to cooperate with
the ITC in supplying the necessary cost or pricing information, the
ITC must use the constructed value of the imported NME goods; this
is determined by calculating the costs of producing the same or similar
merchandise in a surrogate market economy to the extent such informa-
tion is publicly available.76
Despite the high level of governmental involvement in the energy
trade of many Middle Eastern countries, such countries would not be
considered NMEs for the purposes of the antidumping law. However,
a number of NMEs, including the Soviet Union, China, and Romania,
are heavily involved in global energy trade. Energy imports from these
nations would have to be evaluated by reference to the prices or costs of
energy in a surrogate country selected by Commerce. NME rules thus
create significant uncertainty over proper pricing levels for NME im-
ports. The benchmark prices or costs cannot be determined in advance
of the proceeding because the surrogate would be unknown. Based on
72 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1982).
73 Id.
71 19 C.F.R. § 353.52(b) (1989).
7. 19 C.F.R. § 353.52(b)(1) (1989).
71 See, e.g., Urea from the German Democratic Republic, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,549
(Dep't Comm. 1987) (final determination) (Since Commerce was unable to obtain costs
or prices from producers in surrogate countries, Commerce relied on "factors of pro-
duction reported by [respondent] or, where the response was not sufficient, or not ade-
quately verified . . . information provided by petitioner or otherwise available to the
Department. We valued labor in the [surrogate country] from public sources. Where
either the response did not report factors or where [surrogate country] values were not
available from public sources, we used factors and cost data from the petition relative to
the production in the GDR.").
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past NME cases, however, the possible surrogates could be narrowed
down to a handful that Commerce would be likely to seriously con-
sider.7 7 NME exporters could then use as benchmarks the prices used
in such countries in seeking to avoid providing goods at LTFV.
A more difficult problem likely to arise in an antidumping investi-
gation involving an NME is the impact that trade in fungible products,
such as energy products, would have on calculating foreign market
value. In Urea from the German Democratic Republic,7 8 Commerce
recognized that because the merchandise under investigation was "urea
* . . a fungible commodity traded throughout the world. . . , the level
of market share of a specific group of importers tend[ed] to affect sales
elsewhere."'7 9 That investigation disclosed evidence that urea from
NMEs, which were "major participants in world urea trade," was a
significant cause of distorted "urea prices worldwide." 8 Consequently,
Commerce concluded that "determining foreign market value on the
basis of prices in any market would be inappropriate.""' So, too, NME
exports of energy products may render price-based FMV calculations
unreliable, and force Commerce to use factors of production valued in a
surrogate country from publicly available data.
If, however, Commerce determines that the surrogate country's ex-
ports are made at prices that permit recovery of all costs within a rea-
sonable period of time, then Commerce will use this surrogate's third
country sales, notwithstanding the fungibility of the subject
merchandise.82
2.7. Scope and Circumvention Issues
As noted above, antidumping orders are country specific and apply
to imports from a particular exporting nation. This country specificity
poses difficult questions regarding energy products that are trans-
shipped through numerous countries before reaching their final destina-
tion. Such products may be blended with similar or identical products
77 See, e.g., Urea from the Socialist Republic of Romania, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,553
(Dep't Comm. 1987) (Commerce selected the United Kingdom as the surrogate for
Romania.); Urea from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,557
(Dep't Comm. 1987) (Commerce selected the United Kingdom as the surrogate for the
USSR.); Potassium Permanganate from the People's Republic of China, 48 Fed. Reg.
36,175 (Dep't Comm. 1987) (Commerce initially selected India as the surrogate for
China.).
718 52 Fed. Reg. 19,549 (Dep't Comm. 1987).
79 Id. at 19,550.
:0 Id.
81 Id.
82 See Potassium Chloride from the German Democratic Republic, 50 Fed. Reg.
4,559, 4,560 (Dep't Comm. 1985) (final determination).
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from other nations, or undergo substantial processing in other coun-
tries, en route.
2.7.1. Scope
2.7.1.1. Transshipment
The mere transshipment of energy through other nations by a for-
eign producer does not preclude the application of antidumping du-
ties.8" In certain circumstances, however, an intermediate country will
be deemed the country of exportation for purposes of calculating FMV.
For example, if a manufacturer or producer does not know at the time
of sale the country to which the buyer intends to export the merchan-
dise, the merchandise is exported for resale by, or on behalf of, the
buyer to a country other than the United States, and the merchandise
undergoes substantial transformation, then the intermediate country
will be deemed the country of exportation.8
2.7.1.2. Substantial Transformation
Merchandise can also be deemed to originate in an intermediate
country if the merchandise undergoes sufficient processing operations so
as to be "substantially transformed" into a different article of merchan-
dise. In making substantial transformation determinations, Commerce
does not consider itself bound by customs precedents, especially where
further processing might be perceived as an avenue for circumvention of
an antidumping investigation or order. 5
Whether the processing of energy forms constitutes substantial
transformation is a question of fact, and depends on the degree and
extent of primary processing, the value added thereby, and the differ-
ences in characteristics, circumstances, uses, and distribution of the
processed and unprocessed energy.86 Under the substantial transforma-
83 See Calcium Partothenate from Japan, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,933, 59,934 (Dep't
Comm. 1980).
8- 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f) (Supp. V 1987).
8" See Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of 256 Kilobits and
Above from Japan, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,396, 28,397 (Dep't Comm. 1986) (investigation
suspended).
8 See, e.g., Tapered Roller Bearings and Certain Components Thereof from Ja-
pan, 46 Fed. Reg. 40,550, 40,551 (1981) (unfinished tapered roller bearing parts were
the not same class or kind of merchandise as finished tapered roller bearing parts (and
therfore were not included within the scope of the antidumping order) because "[tihere
are major differences in physical characteristics, manner of sale, and use (or lack of it)
between finished and certain unfinished tapered roller bearings .... [T]he finished
manufacturing, assembly, inspection, and packing costs incurred in the United States
on these unfinished components. . . account for approximately 40 percent of the value
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tion test, it is unlikely that the blending of oils or other fungible energy
forms from different nations will change the country of origin of the
product for antidumping purposes .
7
2.7.2. Circumvention
If Commerce were to impose an antidumping order on a fungible
energy product from one or more countries, it might have difficulty
enforcing the order. As noted above, energy products such as oil and
natural gas are highly fungible, and are often combined from many
sources prior to sale and processing in a third country (e.g., the refining
of crude oil into petroleum products). The blending of crude oils prior
to refinement, in addition to transshipment practices, may render it ex-
tremely difficult for a customs official to ascertain the origin of any
particular shipment for purposes of enforcing an antidumping order. In
addition, many energy products, such as oil, are exported to third coun-
tries for refining prior to sale. This increases the prospects of a success-
ful circumvention of dumping duties because a customs invoice might
simply list as the country of origin the country in which the oil was
refined, or the last country in which the crude oil was blended.
Moreover, an antidumping order against several nations may have
little impact on pricing where the energy source is fungible and sold in
international markets. While the producers involved may transfer ship-
ments to other nations to avoid the order, other importers could take
their places. If pricing is set on a global basis, and most exporters are
price takers, the substitute importers, too, will have little choice but to
price at very similar levels. Thus, the effectiveness of antidumping or-
ders in such internationalized markets is doubtful.
of the finished inner race assemblies and other races . . ."; see also 19 C.F.R. §
10.14(b) (1989) (Under Customs regulations, foreign-made articles become products of
the United States if "they undergo a process of manufacture in the United States which
results in their substantial transformation. Substantial transformation occurs when, as a
result of manufacturing processes, a new and different article emerges, having a distinc-
tive name, character, or use, which is different from that originally possessed by the
article or material before being subject to the manufacturing process.").
87 Cf United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, done Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2,
1988, 27 I.L.M. 281. Under Article 301 of the Free-Trade Agreement, a product is
deemed to originate in the territory of a Party (either the United States or Canada) if it
has been "transformed in the territory of either Party ...so as to be subject to a
change in tariff classifications . . . ." However, a product will not be considered to
originate in the territory of a Party "merely by virtue of having undergone mere dilu-
tion with water or another substance that does not materially alter the characteristics of
the good."
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2.8. Fuel Ethanol From Brazil
As noted at the outset, an antidumping case involving fuel ethanol
from Brazil was brought before Commerce and the ITC; Commerce
determined that the subject merchandise was sold for LTFV, but the
ITC determined that the domestic industry was neither materially in-
jured nor threatened with material injury by reason of the LTFV im-
ports. 8 While fuel ethanol is not as important an energy product as oil,
coal, or uranium, the case nevertheless highlights several issues likely to
arise in an energy case.
2.8.1. Foreign Market Value
On the Commerce side of the investigation, two issues arose with
respect to calculating FMV. First, some of the respondents argued that
Commerce should not use home market sales to determine FMV be-
cause of the existence of price controls on fuel ethanol in Brazil.89
Commerce disagreed: "We determined that home market sales could be
used since[:] (1) the mere existence of price controls does not invalidate
home market prices . . .; and (2) these home market sales were in the
ordinary course of trade of fuel ethanol in Brazil."9
Second, Commerce relied on constructed value to determine FMV
because the respondent's home market ethanol sales were made at
prices that did not permit recovery of the acquisition costs. Thus, the
presence of government imposed price controls was an important, and
possibly dispositive, factor.
2.8.2. USP and Middleman Dumping
Commerce also investigated whether the respondent trading com-
panies engaged in "middleman dumping," that is, selling fuel ethanol
abroad at prices below the cost of acquiring the fuel ethanol.9 ' In cases
of middleman dumping, Corrimerce will base USP on the exporter's
sales price.92
Since the trading companies commingled their acquisitions of etha-
nol, both before exportation and between importation and sale in the
88 Fuel Ethanol from Brazil, 51 Fed. Reg. 5,572 (Dep't Comm. 1986) (final af-
firmative, determination); Certain Ethyl Alcohol from Brazil, USITC Pub. No. 1818,
Inv. No. 731-TH-248. (comm. final negative) (March 1986).
89 Fuel Ethanol, 51 Fed. Reg. at 5,574. It appears that the price controls kept
prices artificially low.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 5,573.
92 Id.
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United States, Commerce could not attribute acquisition costs directly
to specific sales of fuel ethanol.93 Consequently, Commerce decided that
basing the middleman dumping analysis "solely upon whether any
sales have been made at prices below acquisition costs by any amount"
would be inappropriate." Instead, Commerce determined that "the
proportion of sales priced below the cost of acquisition as well as the
magnitude of the resulting losses in those sales forms an appropriate
basis" for a finding of middleman dumping.95
Also noteworthy is Commerce's determination of middleman
dumping despite the trading company's major supplier's knowledge at
the time of sale that the merchandise was destined for the United
States. 6 While recognizing the traditional administrative practice of
"using the price between a manufacturer and unrelated trading com-
pany for exports to the United States when the manufacturer knew the
destination at the time of its sale to the exporter, ' 97 Commerce never-
theless elected to examine "all facets of a transaction. Where there is a
specific allegation that a trading company is failing to recover its costs
in transactions concerning the subject merchandise, we will investigate
to determine whether there is 'middleman dumping.'"98
Given the frequent involvement of trading companies in energy
trade, middleman dumping may often be an issue in antidumping cases
involving energy products.
2.8.3. Like Product and Domestic Industry
The ITC's like product analysis turned on the differences in phys-
ical characteristics between fuel ethanol and ethanol used for other in-
dustrial applications. 9
The role that government frequently plays in energy was an espe-
cially important factor with respect to the domestic industry and injury
issues. In this regard, the domestic ethanol industry's growth was the
result of both federal and state government policies. As the ITC noted:
In the mid-1970s, the U.S. government set up a program of
tax subsidies and loan guarantees to spur development of the
:3 Id.
" Id. (emphasis added).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 5,576-77.
7 Id. at 5,577.
98 Id.
9 Ethyl Alcohol from Brazil, USITC Pub. 1818, Inv. No. 731-TH-248, at 3-4.
("[Ilmported fuel ethanol is separate and distinct from imported industrial ethanol be-
cause of its concentration and its chemical impurities.").
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domestic fuel ethanol industry and other renewable domestic
fuel sources. Many states also provided tax subsidies of their
own as additional incentives to produce fuel ethanol ....
[Ilt has had to rely on subsidies in order to compete in the
marketplace. In 1985 those subsidies averaged 95 cents per
gallon."'
Thus, while encouraging the fuel ethanol industry's growth, substantial
financial support from the government may also have resulted in deny-
ing the industry relief from LTFV imports. Although the industry was
relatively young, it exhibited "signs of strength, contrary to what one
normally expects to find in an emerging industry which has encoun-
tered difficulties developing consumer acceptance for a new product."' 01
Similarly, other energy product industries may find that govern-
ment support in the form of subsidies or tax incentives, while improv-
ing the industry's performance, may make proving material injury from
LTFV imports very difficult.
2.8.4. Circumvention
Commerce briefly noted its concern about the possibility that the
antidumping order could be circumvented through importation of etha-
nol blends. To prevent such circumvention, Commerce announced its
intention to work closely with the Customs Service.10 2
3. SECTION 301 AND ENERGY TRADE
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 197403 is designed to enable the
President to:
(A) enforce the rights of the United States under any trade
agreement; or (B) to respond to any act, policy, or practice of
a foreign country or instrumentality that (i) is inconsistent
with the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the
United States under, any trade agreement, or (ii) is unjustifi-
able, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens or re-
stricts United States commerce; the President shall take all
appropriate and feasible action within his power to enforce
such rights or to obtain the elimination of such act, policy, or
100 Id. at 5.
101 Id.
'02 Fuel Ethanol, 51 Fed. Reg. at 5,573.
"3 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-15 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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practice.'
3.1. Actionable Practices
Section 301, by its terms, is broad in scope and allows the Presi-
dent to take action against a wide range of "unfair" practices by foreign
governments with respect to both goods and services.10 5 Unfair govern-
ment policies and practices that may be subject to retaliation under Sec-
tion 301 can fall into one or more of three categories: "unjustifiable,"
"unreasonable," and "discriminatory."
An "unjustifiable act" is "any act, policy or practice which is in
violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the
United States," including any act, policy, or practice that "denies na-
tional or most-favored-nation treatment, the right of establishment, or
protection of intellectual property rights."'0 6 Such measures as tariffs
or other import restrictions that impair the value of trade commitments
to the United States are included within this category.'
104 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (Supp. V 1987).
105 See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7186, 7301-03 ("Under Section 301 the President
would be given broad authority to retaliate against both 'unreasonable' as well as 'un-
justifiable' import restrictions . . . which are illegal under international law or incon-
sistent with international obligations . . . . [T]he Committee amended subparagraph
301(a) ...to make it explicit that U.S. commerce includes U.S. services associated
with international trade.").
10a 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e)(4) (Supp. V 1987). Interestingly, although the provision
that denial of protection of intellectual property rights is "unjustifiable" was added to
Section 301 in 1984, recent Section 301 determinations that have focused on inadequate
protection of intellectual property rights have been phrased in terms of finding such
policies to be "unreasonable," rather than "unjustifiable." See, e.g., Presidential Docu-
ments, Memorandum of July 21, 1988, Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade
Act [sic], 53 Fed. Reg. 28,177 (1988) (President determined that the Government of
Brazil's "failure to provide process and product patent protection for pharmaceutical
products is unreasonable"); Memorandum of Oct. 6, 1986, Determination Under Sec-
tion 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,993 (1986) (President determined
that Brazilian laws and policies restricting foreign investment, including U.S. invest-
ment, in Brazilian informatics sector and withholding "adequate and effective intellec-
tual property protection for U.S. computer software and other informatics products"
were "unreasonable").
107 See, e.g., Memorandum of Dec. 24,1987, Determination Under Section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974, 52 Fed. Reg. 49,139 (1987) (President determined that Euro-
pean Community's "Council Directive Prohibiting the Use in Livestock Farming of
Certain Substances Having a Hormonal Action" was inconsistent with the GATT
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and, therefore, unjustifiable); Memorandum
of April 17, 1987, Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 52 Fed.
Reg. 13,419 (1987) (President determined that the Government of Japan had not im-
plemented or enforced provisions of the United States-Japan Arrangement concerning
Trade in Semiconductors, and that such inaction impaired U.S. benefits under the Ar-
rangement and was unjustifiable).
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An "unreasonable act" is "any act, policy, or practice which, while
not necessarily in violation of or inconsistent with the international le-
gal rights of the United States, is otherwise deemed to be unfair and
inequitable," includes the denial of fair and equitable: "(A) market op-
portunities; (B) opportunities for the establishment of an enterprise; or
(C) provision of adequate and effective protection of [United States]
intellectual property rights."10 8 Also included is the provision of export
subsidies on commodities that depress the world price for such
commodities." 9
A "discriminatory action" is "any act, policy, or practice which
denies national or most-favored-nation treatment to United States
goods, services, or investment. '"" 0 Thus, discriminatory foreign govern-
ment standards or rules with respect to a product's marketing or pro-
duction, discriminatory rules of origin, and retroactive business prac-
tices are actionable."'
3.2. U.S. Commerce
The President is authorized to respond to an act, policy, or prac-
tice of a foreign country or instrumentality that is "unjustifiable, unrea-
108 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e)(3) (Supp. V 1987). See, e.g., Korea's Restrictions on Ac-
cess to Its Wine Market, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,607 (1988) (investigation of Korean prac-
tices, including "combination of a 100 percent tariff applied to table wines and a quota
on imports, creating a price escalation through the distribution system that prevents
imported wine from being price competitive with domestically produced wine"); Mem-
orandum of Nov. 16, 1984, Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, 49 Fed. Reg. 45,733 (1984) (President determined that Argentina's importation
restrictions, "through its postal authorities, on services provided by U.S. courier compa-
nies are unreasonable"); Memorandum of August 14, 1986, Determination Under Sec-
tion 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 29,445 (1986) (President determined
that the Republic of Korea's policy of "denying effective protection to intellectual prop-
erty rights" was unreasonable).
'09 See Memorandum of June 28, 1982, Determination Under Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,361 (1982) (President determined that the Euro-
pean Economic Community's provision of subsidies on sugar exports was "inconsistent
with the ...[GATT] Standards Code ...and depressed U.S. sugar prices," and
appeared to agree with the petitioner's contention that the subsidies imposed were "un-
reasonable burdens on U.S. commerce").
110 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e)(5) (Supp. V 1987).
11' See, e.g., Korea's Restrictions on Access to Its Cigarette Market, 53 Fed. Reg.
4,926 (1988) (investigation of the Republic of Korea's practices of, inter alia, "[flixing
the retail price of imported cigarettes at a prohibitively high level through a combina-
tion of a high tariff, discriminatory domestic taxes . . . restricting imports and dictating
the brand mix, and quantity of imports without reference to market factors . . .[and]
imposing a discriminatory retail margin"); Presidential Determination Under Section
301(a), Soviet Marine Insurance Practices, 43 Fed. Reg. 25,212 (1978) (President de-
termined that the Soviet Union applied a higher insurance rate to cover insurance of
U.S. flag vessels in United States-Soviet Union grain trade, and excluded U.S. marine
cargo underwriters from participation in United States-Soviet Union bilateral trade).
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sonable, or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States
Commerce.""' 2
Under the statute, the term "commerce" includes not only interna-
tional trade in merchandise, but also "services (including transfers of
information) associated with international trade, whether or not such
services are related to specific goods," and "foreign direct investment"
by U.S. persons "with implications for trade in goods and services.""'
Thus, any unfair acts that burden or restrict U.S. services or direct
investments may be actionable. For example, the application of Section
301 opened the Korean insurance market to foreign firms, including
U.S. firms." 4
3.3. Section 301 Procedure
A proceeding under Section 301 may be self-initiated by the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) or initiated by any "inter-
ested person" who files a petition with the USTR. 15 Once a petition is
self-initiated or a private petition is accepted and the case initiated, the
USTR conducts an investigation and recommends to the President ap-
propriate action under Section 301. 16 Before making recommendations,
the USTR must, unless expedited action is required, provide an oppor-
tunity for the presentation of views, including a public hearing if re-
quested, and obtain advice from the appropriate industry advisory
representatives."'
After deciding to initiate a Section 301 case, the USTR, on behalf
of the United States, must request consultations with the foreign coun-
try or instrumentality named in the petition." 8 If the case involves a
trade agreement and no mutually acceptable resolution is reached dur-
ing any consultation period prescribed in the agreement, the USTR
must initiate proceedings pursuant to any formal dispute resolution
procedures provided for thereunder. Resorting to such dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms, especially under the GATT, often results in lengthy
delays in obtaining meaningful relief.
112 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
113 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e)(1) (Supp. V 1987). See also S. REP. No. 1298, supra
note 105, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 7303.
114 See Initiation of Investigation Under Section 301: Korea's Restrictions on In-
surance Services, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (1985).
M1 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The USTR must make recom-
mendations within the statutory time limit, and within one year in any event. Id.
16 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
117 19 U.S.C. §§ 2155, 2412(b)(2), 2414(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
118 19 U.S.C. § 2413 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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3.4. Unfair Energy Practices: Prospects and Risks
Since foreign energy production is heavily regulated and, indeed,
often controlled by foreign governments, Section 301 may be the most
appropriate mechanism with which to redress unjustifiable, unreasona-
ble, or discriminatory foreign governmental acts, policies or practices
that affect the energy trade. The breadth of the statute, and the presi-
dential discretion thereunder, make it a weapon particularly well suited
for responding to such practices.
At the same time, such proceedings, particularly with respect to
oil, gas, and uranium, could cause considerable international tension.
Foreign governments view the right to control natural resources within
their territories as a national right. Moreover, governmental energy
policies frequently are based on national security considerations. In-
deed, U.S. energy policy is driven largely by security concerns. Thus, a
foreign nation may view a Section 301 action challenging its actions
and policies as an affront to its sovereignty.
A potential petitioner's chief prospects for success in using Section
301 are in remedying unreasonable or discriminatory actions, rather
than unjustifiable actions, since few agreements currently provide the
United States with benefits regarding energy trade."19
Private parties could use Section 301 to enforce U.S. rights under
the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement (FTA). For example,
the two-tier pricing practices of foreign governments, which provide
low prices at home and higher prices abroad for energy products, ar-
guably are "discriminatory" practices.12°
Similarly, many practices of the Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC) cartel, including its fixing of the levels of
prices, output, and exports to the United States, may be unreasonable
or discriminatory conduct under the statute.1 21 (The United States-Ca-
119 See FTA, supra note 1. The FTA devotes an entire chapter to energy trade.
The provisions are designed to ensure that any measures regulating energy enacted by
one party will not have adverse effects on the other party's ability, to trade in that
energy product. Specific annexes address trade in uranium (Annex 902.5) and hydroe-
lectric power (Annex 905.2).
12o See supra note 110.
121 Although Section 301 has never been successfully invoked to remedy anticom-
petitive practices, the Auto Internacional Association, a group of independent manufac-
turers and wholesale distributors of auto parts, filed a petition in May 1988, which it
withdrew in July 1988, after it became apparent that the Administration strongly op-
posed it. The petition alleged that the Japanese government permitted the use of preda-
tory and anticompetitive practices by Japanese auto manufacturers and auto parts sup-
pliers. According to the the Association, these practices resulted in an expanding
Japanese share of the U.S. market for auto parts, and a shrinking U.S. share of the
Japanese market. The complaint was phrased so as to track certain amendments to
Section 301, appearing in H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), and H.R. 4848, 100th
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nada Free-Trade Agreement is a major exception.) Such action plainly
burdens U.S. commerce.
The nationalization of a U.S. energy company's overseas facility
by the host government is also arguably a discriminatory action that
burdens or restricts U.S. direct investment in that country. For exam-
ple, a U.S. oil company might bring a Section 301 action to exert pres-
sure on the foreign government involved to provide proper compensa-
tion for expropriating its foreign facility. The leverage for obtaining
reasonable compensation would come from the risk that the nation in-
volved could lose trade benefits and face trade restrictions under Section
301 if just, prompt, and reasonable compensation were not awarded to
the U.S. company. Thus, Section 301 would not prove very useful vis-
a-vis a nation such as Libya, which presently has virtually no economic
relations with the United States. On the other hand, the statute could
prove useful vis-A-vis countries such as Angola, Egypt, and especially
Mexico, which do have trade relations with the United States.
The use of Section 301 may also prove expedient in the oil and gas
equipment and services sector. As other nations increasingly compete in
this market, U.S. companies may face additional restrictions on the ex-
port of oil field equipment and technical services, including both tariffs
and non-tariff barriers. Indeed, if oil prices rise again, foreign govern-
ments may target this sector for investment and development, and take
steps to protect it from outside competition. Conversely, a foreign gov-
ernment might use export subsidies and other financial incentives to
boost exports and increase its industry's market share at the expense of
other countries' oil and gas equipment industries.
In electricity trade, Section 301 could also prove useful to the ex-
tent that Canada continues to deny U.S. consumers and industries
equal access to its energy, particularly electricity, notwithstanding the
FTA.1
22
Finally, although Section 301 traditionally has been viewed as a
tool for opening foreign markets to U.S. products and services, the stat-
ute could also be used to counteract burdens and restrictions on U.S.
trade and commerce caused by unfair acts, policies, and practices re-
garding exports to the United States. The legislative history of Section
301 demonstrates that Congress intended the President to have the au-
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988), that specify that Section 301 applies to anticompetitive, cartel-
like practices.
122 See, e.g., Ontario Government Introduces Three Bills Aimed at Circum-
venting Free Trade Agreement, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 973 (Jul. 6, 1988) (Among
the legislation was a proposal to "limit electricity exports to the United States and force
exports prices higher than those charged Canadian consumers.").
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thority to retaliate against subsidized exports that reduce domestic sales
by U.S. companies.' 23
Invoking Section 301 in response to subsidized imports from for-
eign countries is not without precedent. In 1982, the Administration
used Section 301 to initiate dispute settlement proceedings with the Eu-
ropean Community on the reduction of or elimination of the European
Community's export subsidies.1 2 4 In that case, the subsidies caused
world sugar prices to fall; low prices adversely affected U.S. sugar pro-
ducers. Even though the subsidies reduced primarily U.S. exports of
refined sugar, the case nevertheless demonstrates that Section 301 need
not be viewed simply as a market opening tool.
In another 1982 case, the Tool and Stainless Steel Industry Com-
mittee and the United Steelworkers of America alleged that the Euro-
pean Community, Belgium, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Aus-
tria, and Sweden were subsidizing the production of specialty steel "in
a manner inconsistent with their obligations under . . . [the GATT]
Subsidies Code."1125 The USTR determined that "imports [of specialty
steel] have steadily captured a larger share of the U.S. market, further
depressing operating rates, employment, prices and revenues."126 Con-
sequently, the President ordered the ITC to conduct an expedited Sec-
tion 201 investigation and the USTR to initiate multinational and bi-
lateral discussions to eliminate trade-distortive practices in this
sector.
1
1
7
More recently, U.S. officials have reportedly considered using Sec-
tion 301 to retaliate against Canadian violations of the softwood lumber
pact, 2 ' under which the Canadian government promised to offset the
effects of Canadian softwood lumber export subsidies through export
charges.' 29 Any Canadian failure to comply with the pact would be
12I See S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 105, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 7208; H. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1973) ("Under Section 301
the President may suspend or otherwise limit the benefits of trade agreements, or im-
pose duties or other import restrictions on the products of countries that ... provide
subsidies . . . which have the effect of . . . reducing sales of U.S. -products in the
domestic market."). However, presidential action against subsidized imports under sec-
tion 301 must be predicated upon a prior finding that the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws do not provide an adequate remedy. Id.
... See supra note 109.
... Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 47 Fed. Reg.
51,717 (1982).
126 Id. at 51,718.
127 See id. at 51,717. The President's memorandum also hinted at possible addi-
tional action on an "emergency interim basis." Id.
128 Administration Hints at Section 301 Retaliation against Canada, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, July 29, 1988.
129 Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of Canada and the
United States of America to resolve differences with respect to the conditions affecting
[Vol. 11:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol11/iss2/3
UNFAIR TRADE LAWS & ENERGY FLOWS
unjustifiable and unreasonable under Section 301."'°
In view of the foregoing, using Section 301 to offset the adverse
effects of cheap energy imports on the domestic energy industry is in-
triguing. Indeed, compared to the antidumping law, Section 301 ap-
pears to be a more effective trade remedy statute in several respects.
First, a domestic energy producer bringing an antidumping petition
must comply with several procedural requirements.' In contrast, Sec-
tion 301 merely requires that the domestic party filing the petition be
any interested person.' 82 Section 301 has no express standing or repre-
sentation requirements, but simply a requirement that the petitioner
"describe briefly the interest of the petitioner which is affected by...
the act, policy or practice which is the subject of the petition."'3 3
Second, the flexibility of Section 301 permits producers in one par-
ticular energy sector, such as coal, to seek relief from unfair foreign
acts, policies, or practices in another energy sector, such as electricity or
oil. This possibility contrasts sharply with the like product analysis in
the antidumping statute. More importantly, this flexibility responds to
a basic reality to which the relatively rigid antidumping law cannot
respond-an energy product may be price sensitive to a different, but
substitutable, energy product. As the price of oil rose in the 1970s, for
example, investment in developing other energy products, such as nu-
clear power, natural gas, and, to a lesser degree, synthetic fuels also
increased. 3 When oil prices collapsed in 1985, these alternative energy
industries suffered, as consumers and businesses returned to heating
their homes and running their factories with cheap oil. Section 301,
unlike the antidumping laws, could be invoked relatively easily by such
industries against oil or other different energy products.
Third, apart from the effect of cheap oil imports on other energy
product industries, it is fundamentally incongruous to discuss dumped
energy products in the context of the antidumping laws. As a general
matter, energy producing countries do not export their energy products
trade in softwood lumber products, Dec. 30, 1986, United States-Canada (amended
Dec. 16, 1987 and Apr. 7, 1988) (available through Office of the United States Trade
Representative).
... Memorandum of Dec. 30, 1986, Determination Under Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974, 52 Fed. Reg. 231 (1987).
a See supra notes 7-20 and accompanying text.
l 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
's 15 C.F.R. § 2006.1(a) (1989). The petition must also include as much infor-
mation as is reasonably available to the petitioner about the foreign act, policy or prac-
tice that is the subject of the petition, including the following: the foreign governments
or instrumentalities that are involved; the products or services that are affected by the
foreign act, policy, or practice; and the volume of trade involved. 15 C.F.R. §
2006.1(a)-(f) (1989).
134 See ENERGY SECURITY, supra note 1.
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at prices below home market prices or the cost of production. On the
contrary, the form of price discrimination that is more likely to be en-
countered is two-tier pricing, whereby domestic users benefit from en-
ergy prices lower than those available in foreign markets. In short, two-
tier price discrimination is precisely the reverse of the price discrimina-
tion contemplated in the antidumping laws. Section 301, however, is
sufficiently flexible to address the burdens on U.S. commerce and trade
that may result from two-tier pricing.
3.5. Remedy Options
Upon making an affirmative finding under Section 301, the Presi-
dent may take "all appropriate and feasible actions within his power"
to remedy the practice.' The President may exercise authority with
respect to "any goods or sector" on a nondiscriminatory basis, or solely
against the foreign country or instrumentality involved, regardless of
whether such goods or sector were included in the act, policy, or prac-
tice.'" 6 Thus, the President can retaliate against an unfair practice in-
volving energy through actions directed against other goods or sectors.
This ability gives the President substantial leverage to act if the United
States engages in substantial trade with the target nation.
The President's range of possible actions is broad. He may utilize
any power within his authority under the Constitution and federal law.
He may also seek legislation to rectify the practice, as has been done in
the past.'
37
Section 301 empowers the President to suspend, withdraw, or pre-
vent the application of trade agreements, or to impose duties or other
import restrictions on the products of a foreign country or instrumen-
tality, or to impose fees or restrictions on their services. 3 Thus, the
President could establish a variable import fee on oil, or quotas on nat-
ural gas imports. The President may also restructure the terms and
conditions of service sector authorizations (i.e., any lease, permit, or
other authorization issued under federal law that permits foreign sup-
pliers access to the U.S. market) or deny the issuance of such
"' 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
136 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
137 See Memorandum of July 31, 1980, Determination Under Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974, 45 Fed. Reg. 51,173 (1980) (President determined that enactment
of "mirror legislation" was "an appropriate and feasible response to the Canadian
practice of denying an income tax deduction to Canadian advertisers who contract with
U.S. television and radio broadcasting stations located near the U.S.-Canadian border
... for advertising aimed primarily at the Canadian market").
138 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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authorizations.'" 9
Additionally, the President, could negotiate bilateral or multilat-
eral agreements on energy trade pursuant to his inherent constitutional
authority. Such negotiations could be directed at remedying unfair
practices, such as two-tier pricing, or opening foreign markets to U.S.
energy products and related products (such as oil and gas equipment).
Agreements frequently are negotiated to settle Section 301 investi-
gations. Such agreements include the United States-Japan semiconduc-
tor arrangement,14 ° the leather and footwear agreement between the
United States and Japan,"4' and most recently, the United States-Japan
agreements on beef and citrus. 42 As a practical matter, the primary
advantage of these agreements is that they require a foreign government
to take actions to remedy the unfair act, policy, or practice. Thus, the
President requires no additional statutory authority to resolve the
dispute.
Such agreements could be enforced under Section 301 because a
violation of the agreement by the foreign government would constitute
an unjustifiable act, policy, or practice. Indeed, the parties could ex-
pressly stipulate that violation of the agreement would be considered
unjustifiable or unreasonable and therefore subject to retaliation.' 43
The actual remedy options that would likely be selected in a Sec-
tion 301 case involving energy products are difficult to determine, and
probably would vary from case to case. As a policy matter, the USTR
seeks to target retaliation against the same sector as the products subject
to the unfair practice, despite authority to target any goods or services.
Cases involving unrelated unfair practices could also affect energy
trade because the statute does not dictate that the relief granted under
its authority be confined to the product or products with which the
actionable practice is concerned. However, because inexpensive energy
is available from abroad, the United States would incur as a cost the
lost benefits of inexpensive resources for the economy. Thus, costs to
the domestic economy and to consumers must be considered in shaping
Section 301 relief.
Furthermore, one should recognize that price and quality restric-
tions directed against a single country may not be effective due to the
139 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b), (e)(6) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
140 Arrangement Concerning Trade in Semiconductor Products, Sept. 2, 1986,
United States-Japan, 25 I.L.M. 1409-28.
141 Proclamation No. 5,448, Increase in the Rates of Duty on Certain Articles
From Japan, 51 Fed. Reg. 9435 (1986).
142 Investigation Concerning Japan's Restrictions on Imports of Fresh Oranges
and Orange Juices, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,714 (1988).
143 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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global scope of energy markets.
In addition, until recently, Presidents have been reluctant to em-
ploy Section 301 against the United States' trading partners for fear of
retaliation against U.S. exports. This issue, too, must be considered in
shaping relief, although the apparent willingness of the Reagan Ad-
ministration to invoke or threaten to invoke Section 301 sanctions
against important trading partners, such as Japan, suggests that this
consideration is now less important than it once was.
Finally, one should note that although the remedy options under
Section 301 are far more flexible and offer potentially greater prospects
for effective relief than those under the antidumping law, the risks pre-
sent under Section 301 are likewise greater. Under the antidumping
law, once all of the statutory requirements have been met, action by
Commerce is mandatory. The same cannot be said of Section 301. A
domestic energy industry, such as coal, may present an excellent case
for relief from the impact of unfairly low priced oil, and yet, the Presi-
dent may decide that cheaper energy imports are of greater importance
to the U.S. economy than a stronger and healthier coal industry.
3.6. Section 301 and the 1988 Trade Agreement
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (the Act)
14
made several changes to Section 301 that may significantly alter the
prospects and risks for petitioners and respondents under Section 301.
The amendment most likely to have a substantial impact on future
cases is the mandatory retaliation provision. The Act requires
mandatory retaliation, subject to narrow exceptions, in cases where: (1)
U.S. rights under a trade agreement are being denied; or (2) an act,
policy, or practice of a foreign government violates, is inconsistent with,
or denies U.S. benefits under a trade agreement, or is "unjustifiable"
and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce. " 5 While the form of retalia-
tion is discretionary, the economic amount must be equivalent in value
to the burden or restriction imposed by the foreign unfair practice on
U.S. commerce. " 6 Consequently, violations of a trade agreement by a
foreign power involving energy products and resulting from an earlier
Section 301 investigation could result in mandatory sanctions.
14 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 1301, Pub. L. No.
100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411).
145 Id. at 1164.
146 Id.
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4. CONCLUSION
Section 301 and the antidumping law are very different unfair
trade statutes, which can be invoked by petitioners if they can meet the
considerable requirements needed for relief, and if they believe the
available relief could be effective. Each statute has certain advantages.
Meaningful relief against a particular nation's pricing policies and
other unfair practices in international energy markets may be difficult
to obtain. At the same time, however, foreign energy producers should
understand the risks of trade restrictions and factor them into their bus-
iness planning.
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